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NOTES

The Burger Court's Unified Approach to Standing and
Its Impact on Congressional Plaintiffs
Since 1969, Chief Justice Warren Burger and five Associate
Justices' have brought a new sense of political conservatism to the
United States Supreme Court.2 From this conservatism has
emerged an "interpretivist" view of the Constitution 3 -one which
tends toward judicial restraint and enforces only those norms either
stated or clearly implicit in the written document itself.4 This view
insists that "the work of the political branches.

.

.[shall] be invali-

dated only in accord with an inference discoverable in the Constitution." 5 Such deference to the political process is strongly
evidenced by the Court's use of the standing doctrine to restrict
access to the federal courts.
During the Burger Court's tenure, standing evolved from a
simple constitutional test to a complex prudential inquiry. 6 This
1 ChiefJustice Warren E. Burger assumed office on June 23, 1969; Associate Justice
Harry A. Blackmun assumed office on June 9, 1970; Associate Justice Louis F. Powell, Jr.
assumed office on Jan. 7, 1972; Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist assumed office on
Jan. 7, 1972; Associate Justice John Paul Stevens assumed office on Dec. 19, 1975; and
Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor assumed office on Sept. 25, 1981.
2 See, e.g., Caine, Judicial Review-Democracy Versus Constitutionality, 56 TEMP. L.Q. 297,
327, 328 (1983).
3 One commentator claims that there is no reason to suppose that any necessary correlation exists between the "interpretivist" view of the Constitution and political conservatism. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 1 (1980). However, political conservatism
generally suggests the cautious, deliberate approach to decisionmaking characteristic of
"interpretivist" philosophy. Addressing this conservative approach, Professor Cox has
observed:
The Burger Court does not respond to humanitarian, libertarian, and egalitarian
values with all the enthusiasm of its predecessor. It is more worried by complexities, cross-currents, and needs of accommodation that refuse to yield to optimistic
generalizations. A court more concerned with the preservation of old substantive
values than the articulation of a new spirit is likely to find few occasions for rendering activist decisions ....
A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 101-02 (1976).
4 Id. See also Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 704
(1975).
5 J. ELY, supra note 3, at 2.
6 In 1962, Justice Brennan observed that standing existed whenever an individual suffered some personal injury. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (citing Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)). In his view, the Constitution required nothing more. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1969) (Brennan, J., concurring). Recently, however, in summarizing the standing doctrine's judicial history, Justice Rehnquist
noted:
The term "standing" subsumes a blend of constitutional requirements and prudential considerations, and it has not always been clear in the opinions of this
1187
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development has caused considerable analytical confusion in determining who may sue in federal court. 7 This confusion is especially
apparent when congressmen, suing as congressmen, attempt judicially to redress allegedly illegal or unconstitutional conduct by the
8
executive or legislative branch.
This note explores how the Burger Court's philosophy ofjudicial restraint has reshaped the standing inquiry and affected judicial
handling of cases brought by congressional plaintiffs. Part I traces
the standing doctrine's evolution from a simple test under the Warren Court to a complex inquiry under the Burger Court. Part II
examines the development of particular standing rules for congressmen. Part III then suggests that the District of Columbia Circuit misread both the Supreme Court's decision in Goldwater v.
Carter9 and several of its own cases, prompting a radical change in
congressional standing analysis. Part III argues that this new approach, termed "equitable discretion," is incompatible with the
Burger Court's philosophy of judicial restraint. Finally, part IV
concludes that the Burger Court's deference to the political process
and its restrictive view of standing threaten to make congressional
standing a nullity.
I. The Standing Doctrine
Article III of the United States Constitution restricts federal jurisdiction to legitimate "cases" or "controversies."' 1 From this
constitutional requirement has emerged the doctrine of justiciability: a set of prerequisites to federal court jurisdiction."I The
Court whether particular features of the "standing" requirement have been required by Art. III ex proprio vigore, or whether they are requirements that the Court
itself has erected and which were not compelled by the language of the
Constitution.
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
7 Compare Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) and United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1972) with Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26
(1976).
8 See, e.g., McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REv. 241 (1981);
Note, The Justiciability of Congressional-PlaintiffSuits, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 526 (1982); Note,
CongressionalAccess to the Federal Courts, 90 HAtv. L. REv. 1632 (1977); Comment, Standing
Versus Justiciability: Recent Developments in ParticipatorySuits Brought by Congressional Plaintiffs,
1982 B.Y.U. L. REv. 371.
9 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
10 U.S. CoNST. art III, § 2, provides in part:
The judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend to all Cases in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and Treaties
made... under their Authority.. . [and] to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party. ...
11 The justiciability requirements limit the power of the federal judiciary "to questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution
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justiciability doctrine prescribes four basic elements. First, a litigant must be a proper party to invoke judicial authority-that is, he
must have "standing."' 2 Second, the claim must be a fully developed, or a "ripe," controversy. 13 Third, the controversy must be
14
active at every stage of disposition to avoid dismissal as "moot."'
And fourth, the claim may not be heard if it involves a "political
question."' 5
A.

The Warren Court's Liberalization of Standing

During the Warren Court years, the standing requirement was
designed simply to ensure that plaintiffs pursued their claims vigorously. 16 Under Baker v. Carr,17 the standing inquiry focused solely
on the "status" of the party bringing suit; the claimant was not required to show that he actually was entitled to substantive relief.'8
Carr required a plaintiff merely to have a legitimate interest in the
issue litigated such that some "concrete adverseness" existed to
fulfill the "case" or "controversy" requirement. 19
Historically, these legitimate interests existed where plaintiffs
sought to protect personal rights established at law. 20 In Flast v.
Cohen,2 1 however, the Warren Court permitted a plaintiff, suing in a
through the judicial process." But further, they refine the role of "thejudiciary in a tripartite allocation of powers." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
12 See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) ("As an incident to the elaboration of this bedrock
requirement [exercise of the federal judicial power] this Court has always required that a
litigant have 'standing' to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit."). 13 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503 (1961) ("[W]ithin the framework of our adversary system, the adjudicatory process is most securely founded when it is exercised under
the impact of a lively conflict between antagonistic demands, actively pressed, which make
resolution of the controverted issue a practical necessity.").
14 See DeFunis v. Odegard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) ("'[F]ederal courts are without
power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.'
The inability of the federal judiciary 'to review moot cases. . . depends upon the existence
of a case or controversy.' ") (citations omitted).
15 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) ("The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.").
16 Baker, 369 U.S. at 204.
17 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
18 Id. at 208 ("It would not be necessary to decide whether appellants' allegations of
impairment of their votes . . . will, ultimately, entitle them to any relief, in order to hold
that they have standing to seek it. They are asserting 'a plain, direct and adequate interest
.. .[to a personal right].' ").
19 Id. at 204 ("Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions? This is the gist of the question of standing.").
20 See, e.g., Tennessee Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38
(1938) ("The principle [of standing] is without application unless the right invaded is a
legal right,-one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious
invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.") (footnote omitted).
21 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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"public action," 22 to challenge the legality of congressional expenditures. In granting the plaintiff "taxpayer standing," the Court
found a legitimate interest in the controversy where there existed
only "a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim
sought to be adjudicated." 23 Flast departed from prior case law,
which had denied standing to plaintiffs suing as taxpayers, 2 4 and
signaled the relaxation of standing as a hurdle to suing in federal
court.
When the Court later decided Association of Data Processing Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 25 it further diminished the "standing" barriers to federal jurisdiction. In Data Processing, the Court formally
determined that standing extended well beyond legally defined
rights. 2 6 Indeed, standing existed if "the interest sought to be protected . . .[was] arguably within the zone of interests [addressed]
by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 27 Thus, in
addition to protecting personal and economic values, plaintiffs
could sue where aesthetic, conservational, or recreational interests
28
were involved.
The decisions in Flast and Data Processinghad a twofold effect.
First, they increased access to federal courts by permitting plaintiffs
to lodge actions of an increasingly "public" character. 2 9 Second,
they liberally expanded the scope ofjudicial review by reducing the
"injury in fact" standard to an almost negligible threshold
30
requirement.
22 Justice Harlan used this condemnatory phrase while dissenting in Flast. See id. at 120,
(citing L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 483 (1965)).
23 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102.
24 Compare Flast with Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (denying taxpayer
standing). But see Wilson v. Shaw, 240 U.S. 24, 31 (1907); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429,
438 (1906); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 295 (1899) (accepting jurisdiction in taxpayer suits without passing directly on the standing question).
25 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
26 Id. at 153, 154 (The "legal interest" test goes to the merits, while standing addresses
the status of the challenging party.).
27 Id. at 153.
28 Id. at 154.
29 See Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10-11 (1982). Under the Court's old test of standing the inquiry
focused on whether the plaintiff asserted injury to a legally protected interest. Data Processing replaced this somewhat circular rule with the "injury in fact" test. This was considered a
major breakthrough in the area of "public" litigation. SeeJ. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE
COMING OF AGE IN PUBLIC LAW 26-27, 39-40 (1978).
30 See Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 74-75 (1984). One commentator
predicted this expansion of judicial power almost a decade earlier:
[Jiudicial power expands as the requirements of standing are relaxed. . . .[I]f the
so-called public action. . . were allowed with respect to constitutional challenges
to legislation, then the halls of Congress. . .would become. . . only Act I of any
contest to enact legislation. . . .Act II would, with the usual brief interlude, follow in the courts. ...
Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School Prayer Cases, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 1-16.
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This liberalization became most evident in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).3 1 In SCRAP,
the Court allowed plaintiff law students to sue to enjoin the Interstate Commerce Commission from increasing railway freight
charges. The plaintiffs claimed future aesthetic and recreational injury because increased rates allegedly would require manufacturers
to cease using recycled products and start using natural raw materials, in order to remain competitive economically.3 2 The Court
than a "mere
characterized the students' claim as something more
33
interest in the problem," and thus found standing.
Notably, the attenuated line of causation in SCRAP was not important to the liberal majority's standing analysis. So long as the
injuries alleged did not flow through imagined circumstances, questions of causation were left for proof at trial. 34 In dissent, Justice
White argued otherwise. Joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, Justice White found the alleged injuries "too remote,
speculative, and insubstantial" to confer standing. 3 5 They were, in
his opinion, merely "generalized grievances" and thus presented
36
insufficient bases for a justiciable case or controversy.
B.

The Burger Court's Reformulation of Standing

The majority and dissenting opinions in SCRAP evidence a basic tension between diametric goals of article III standing. Argua31 412 U.S. 669 (1972).
32 To establish standing, SCRAP claimed that each of its members suffered economic,
recreational, and aesthetic harm directly as a result of the adverse environmental impact of
the railroad's 2.5%o freight surcharge.
Specifically, SCRAP alleged that each of its members was caused to pay more for
finished products, that each of its members "[u]ses the forests, rivers, streams,
mountains, and other natural resources surrounding the Washington Metropolitan
area and at his legal residence, for camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and other
recreational [and] aesthetic purposes," and that these uses have been adversely
affected by the increased freight rates, that each of its members breathes the air
within the Washington metropolitan area and the area. of his legal residence and
that this air has suffered increased pollution caused by the modified rate structure,
and that each member has been forced to pay increased taxes because of the sums
which must be expended to dispose of otherwise reusuable waste materials.
Id. at 678.
33 The Court rejected the government's attempt to limit standing to "significant harm."
The presence of a "direct stake" in the litigation, even though involving only slight harm,
was enough in SCRAP to allow standing. Id. at 689 n.14. Indeed, as Professor Davis suggested, even a mere "trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of principle." Id.
(quoting Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 613 (1968)). See also
Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 468 (1970). It is difficult to
determine, however, what real differences exist among "direct stake," "trifle," and "mere
interest."
34 See SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 699-700.
35 Id. at 723 (White, J., dissenting).
36 Id.
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bly, standing allows plaintiffs who simply have a "legitimate
interest" in the claim to sue in federal court.37 At the same time,
standing carefully regulates the scope of federal judicial authority
within the Constitution's tripartite scheme of separated powers and
therefore requires guarded application.3 8 The problem, as Justice
Harlan observed candidly in Flast, is one of prudence: the courts
must "determine in what circumstances, consonant with the character and proper functioning of the federal courts, such suits should
39
be permitted."
These conflicting purposes of standing have raised several analytical problems. As a result, the Burger Court has unified the doctrine both to narrowly define the "injury in fact" concept and to
accommodate fundamental separation of powers concerns. Specifically, the Court has focused on two analytical problems with the
traditional standing doctrine.
First, traditional standing analysis purports to be an inquiry independent of the merits. 40 Yet, in assessing a plaintiffs "personal
stake" courts must conduct substantive inquiries. In Flast, for instance, the claimed "nexus" could only be evaluated by addressing
the causation present in the action.'a Similarly, if a plaintiff hopes
to invoke federal judicial power to redress an injury, he logically
must show that the wrong alleged will be remedied by the relief
sought.
Thus, since 1974, the Burger Court has established several
guidelines to determine when standing exists under article III. At
an "irreducible minimum" the Court now requires a federal plaintiff to show some personal injury, actual or threatened, from the
defendant's putatively illegal conduct. 4 2 Additionally, the plaintiff
must show that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged
37 See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 168-69 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See also Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in PublicActions:
The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintil, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, 1034-35 (1968).
38 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
39 Id. at 120 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
40 Flast, 392 U.S. at 101 ("[I]n deciding the question of standing, it is not relevant that
the substantive issues in the litigation might be nonjusticiable.").
41 The very concept of a nexus test requires courts to address the substantive issues of
a case. Id. at 10 1-02. In finding a "nexus" in Flast, the Court relied on two elements. First,
the taxpayer had to show a connection between his status as a taxpayer and the challenged
activity. Id. at 102. Second, the taxpayer had to show that Congress' exercise of its taxing
power violated specific constitutionalrestrictionson that power. Id. at 102-03. This two part test
proved rather unwieldy, however, prompting the Court subsequently to acknowledge that
"[t]he concept of standing to sue. . . 'is surrounded by the same complexities and vagaries
that inhere in [the concept of] justiciability' in general." Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S.
411, 423 (1969) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98 (1968)).
42 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 477 (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
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action" and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. ' '4
Second, traditional standing analysis fails to account for separation of powers concepts inherent in the Constitution. 44 But in
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for a Separation of
Church and State, Inc. 45 the Burger Court integrated the constitutional language of article III with the prudential considerations ac46
companying a healthy deference to the political branches.
In Valley Forge, the Court subsumed into the standing doctrine
the separation of powers principle previously reserved for political
questions. 47 The Court finally suggested analytically what it had
43 454 U.S. at 472 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38,
41 (1976)).
44 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (stating that separation of powers considerations are treated by the political question doctrine). See also McGowan, supra note 8, at 244;
Nichol, supra note 30, at 102. But cf. Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, 85 YALE
L.J. 597, 598-601 (1976) (claiming that "[o]ne needs no special doctrine to describe the
ordinary respect of the courts for the political domain").
45 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
46 Id. at 472-74. The "constitutional" purposes of article III standing are several.
First, it limits "the federal judicial power. . . 'to a role consistent with a system of separated powers .... .' Id. at 473 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 387 U.S. 83, 97 (1960)). Second,
the requirement of "actual injury" ensures that legal issues will be resolved in a concrete
factual setting. Id. The Court classifies as prudential elements of standing the following
rules only: the denial of third-party standing; the refusal to address abstract questions; and
the requirement that complaints fall within "the zone of interests to be protected" by statutory causes of action.
Professor Brilmayer has elaborated on the "actual injury" requirement. See Brilmayer,
The Jurisprudenceof Article IIH Perspectiveson the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 297 (1979). First, she argues that it encourages judicial restraint and protects institutional decisionmaking. Because of the stare decisis doctrine, to allow a court to settle any
matter it wished would give precedential effect to "the preferences of earlier courts, who
are able to tie the hands of subsequent ones." Id. at 304. In Professor Brilmayer's opinion,
a mechanism is needed "to allocate decisionmaking responsibility among successive courts,
by specifying the point at which an issue may be addressed." Id.
Second, Professor Brilmayer identifies in the due process concept a standing element
based on "fairness." Id. at 306. She argues that if an ideological challenger-a challenger
without the traditional "personal stake" in the controversy-were permitted to litigate a
constitutional claim in which he had only an "abstract interest," courts would decide matters which might have strong precedential effects on subsequent traditional litigants. Moreover, there is real concern that "ideological plaintiffs" will frame legal issues more broadly
than necessary in order to obtain the results they desire, rather than the results they require, to redress an actual injury. Id. at 307-08. The standing requirement, therefore, ensures that individuals most affected by the challenged activity will have a role in that
challenge.
47 Within what he termed the constitutional definition of standing, Justice Rehnquist
observed in Valley Forge that:
Proper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional structure requires
neither that the Judicial Branch shrink from a confrontation with the other two
coequal branches of the Federal Government, nor that it hospitably accept for adjudication claims of constitutional violation by other branches of government
where the claimant has not suffered cognizable injury. Thus this Court has "refrain[ed] from passing upon the constitutionality of an act [of the representative
branches] unless obligated to do so in the proper performance of ourjudicial function, when the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it."
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stated prudentially for years-that each citizen's right to require
that the government be administered according to the law is not a
right to seek judicial redress. 48 Rather, as ChiefJustice Burger observed in United States v. Richardson,49 "the absence of any particular
individual or class to litigate [certain constitutional] . . . claims...
[suggests] that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance
50
of Congress, and ultimately to the political process."
II.

Standing Analysis Applied to Congressmen Prior to 1980

The Burger Court markedly has curtailed the Warren Court's
liberal standing rules. First, it has limited "taxpayer standing" to
the Flast scenario. 5 ' Second, by condemning "citizen standing" as
an abstract and undifferentiated challenge, the Court virtually has
eliminated "public actions." 5 2 Nevertheless, congressmen increasThe importance of this precondition should not be underestimated as a means of
"defin[ing] the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power."
454 U.S. at 474 (citations omitted).
48 Id. at 473. See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173 (1974); United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687
(1973); 412 U.S. at 723 (White, J., dissenting); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968);
Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922).
49 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
50 Id. at 179. In the Burger Court's view, the technical rules of standing attempt to
limit the federal judicial power under article III "consistent with a system of separated powers." Valley Forge, 412 U.S. at 472. Moreover, the "actual injury" requirement fixes a controversy in the concrete factual setting "conducive to a realistic appreciation of the
consequences ofjudicial action." Id. This context helps prevent courts from deciding cases
which will disrupt future proceedings through the influence of stare decisis. Additionally, it
ensures that those parties who have "actual injury" will not find that the claims they hope to
raise have been addressed previously in litigation by less dedicated claimants. Id. at 472-73.
Cf. Brilmayer, supra note 46, at 308 ("[W]e do not want the concerned litigant to litigate
abstract principles of constitutional law when the precedent established will govern someone else's . . . rights.").
But see Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to ProfessorBrilmayer, 93 HARV. L.

1698, 1722 (1980) ("[T]he so-called premature decision is not likely to 'inappropriately bind' anyone; rather, it is just the beginning of an evolutionary process in which the
principle [involved] will be reevaluated, refined, and ultimately either vindicated or narREV.

rowed into oblivion ....
); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on
Princple and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1964) ("[T]here is an

obligation to decide in some cases; there is a limit beyond which avoidance devices cannot
be pressed and constitutional dicta cannot be urged without enervating principle to an impermissible degree.").
51 In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974), the Court limited
Flast's "nexus" approach in two ways. First, the Court suggested that the "nexus" rule
applied only to taxpayers. Second, it suggested that taxpayers could sue Congesss only
pursuant to the taxing and spending clause. Cf. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479-82.
52 See Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposalsfor Legislative
Reform, 30 RurGERS L. REV. 863, 871 (1977) ("Schlesinger and Richardson have substituted

'injury in fact' for 'personal stake' and 'nexus' for purposes of the case or controversy requirement and have established the proposition that except in very defined circumstances,
citizens and taxpayers as such do not suffer 'injury in fact' from the government's alleged
violation of the Constitution.").

1985]

NOTES

1195

ingly sue in federal courts to protect the special rights embodied in
their legislative office and to uphold the constitutional workings of
government. 53
The problem surrounding these cases is that when congressmen sue in their legislative capacities they frequently seek resolution of matters which are either best left to the political process or
incapable of judicial resolution. 54 Moreover, the only right which

congressmen have distinguishing them from ordinary citizens is
their congressional vote. 55 Thus, unless they suffer some injury to
their voting powers they fail to allege "injury in fact" under article
11.56 The question of standing ultimately reduces to whether, and

when, congressmen may involve the federal judiciary in protecting
their voting rights against executive or congressional branch

usurpation.
During the early 1970's, when the Warren Court's influence
was still felt, lower federal courts frequently granted congressmen
standing to sue the executive and legislative branches. 5 7 Congres-

sional plaintiffs merely needed to show that, by virtue of their legis-

lative office, they had some "interest" in the challenge. 58 Such suits

often were dismissed prudentially as nonjusticiable political questions. 5 9 But as the standing doctrine changed under the Burger
53 See, e.g., Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 779 (1985); Crockett v. Regan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Vander
Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 91 (1983); Riegle v. Federal
Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981); Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d ,697 (D.C. Cir.),judgmentvacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.); Reuss
v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Harrington v.
Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975).
54 See notes 60-87 infra and accompanying text.
55 See, e.g., Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that a
legislator, may sue to prevent the dilution of his voting power in the legislature, but that
once a bill has become law the congresional interest is indistinguishable from that of any
other citizen); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that a
nullificatiqn of a senat6r's vote by the President's illegal pocket veto gave a federal legislator standing to sue); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939) (holding that the injury to
the effectiveness'of in llvidual votes gave state legislators standing to sue).
56 See note 65 infra.
57 See note 59 infra.
58 For example, in Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted standing where the congressional
plaintiffs' interest in the case would "bear upon" their duties to consider impeachment
proceedings, ratify the executive's actions, or to take other legislative measures.
59 In Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974),
a congresswoman sued to enjoin the bombing of Cambodia, claiming that congressional
termination of funds divested the executive branch of power to continue fighting in Indochina. The court of appeals dismissed the claim as a nonjusticiable political question. In
the opinion's final paragraph, the court made a three-sentence announcement that the
plaintiff probably did not have standing on what later would become the rationale for Kennedy v. Sampson, 511" F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
In Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 13 congressmen sought a declara-
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Court, the barriers to federal court jurisdiction over cases filed by
congressmen grew more formidable.
A.

The Courts of Appeals' Decisions: (1974-1979)

In 1974, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit determined in Kennedy v. Sampson 60 that the President's improper use of a pocket veto illegally prevented a bill from becoming
law. Regarding congressional standing, the court of appeals determined that, as a member of the voting majority, Senator Kennedy
personally had suffered injury in fact to the effectiveness of his vote
for the bill.61 Thus, according to the court, the Senator had standing to challenge the President's action and to seek a declaratory
62
order for the bill to be published as a validly enacted law.

The Kennedy decision rested upon three principles. First, congressmen have a derivative rather than direct interest in protecting
their votes. 63 Second, this derivative interest is nonetheless "personal" for "standing" purposes. 64 And third, some "legislative disenfranchisement" must occur before injury in fact exists. 6 5 Thus,

once Congress (or one of its houses) suffers institutional harm, individual congressmen acquire standing derivatively because they
66
are "among the injured."
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit endorsed this rationale when it applied Kennedy to deny standing to congressmen
challenging the President's allegedly improper enforcement of federal law. In Harringtonv. Schlesinger,67 the court held that once a bill
became law, congressmen had no greater interest in upholding
their interpretation of that law than did other citizens. 68 In such
cases, congressmen could not claim dilution of their voting power
tion that continued American involvement in Indochina was an unconstitutional use of ex-

ecutive power. The court dismissed the case as a political question, holding that the
President had authority to wind-up the current fighting and that the judiciary was incompetent to evaluate whether, in light of foreign and military policies, his actions were proper.
60
61

511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See id. at 435.

62 Chief Judge Carl McGowan of the District of Columbia Circuit has observed that in
Kennedy the court of appeals failed to recognize any constitutional or prudential concerns
"inherent in any effort by a single congressman to transform legislation into law by judicial
fiat." McGowan, supra note 8, at 245.
63 Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 436.
64

Id.

65 Id. See also Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 199 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1977), in which the
court of appeals held that for a congressman to employ the derivative injury concept, "he
must show 1) there has been injury-in-fact done to the Congress, and 2) that he, as an
individual legislator, has been injured-in-fact because of the harm done to the institution."
66 511 F.2d at 435 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)).
67 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975).
68 Id. at 459 ("Once a bill has become law . . .[a congressional plaintiff's] interest is
indistinguishable from that of any other citizen.").
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because they already had successfully exercised that right. Thus,
their claim merely presented a nonjusticiable generalized
9
grievance.6
Two years later, the District of Columbia Circuit refined its
Kennedy rationale. Responding to the Burger Court's contraction of
legal standing, the court of appeals in Harrington v. Bush70 invalidated all pre-Kennedy analyses which granted congressional standing where executive action somehow affected a legislator's "official
interests.''71 According to the Bush court, standing required a
plaintiff to "have such a strong connection to' the controversy that
its outcome will demonstrably cause him to win or lose in some
measure."72 Only Kennedy's strict derivative injury theory satisfied
this criterion. Thus, the congressional plaintiff in Bush lacked
standing where he claimed that certain illegal actions of the Central
Intelligence Agency ("CIA") were not reported to Congress, as required by the public accounting clause, and thereby deprived him
7
of information relevant to intelligently exercising his voting right. "

Distinguishing Kennedy from Bush, the court observed that Senator Kennedy's injury involved the nullification of a specific vote for
a specific bill, within the constitutionally mandated legislative process. 74 To that extent, the injury in Kennedy was measured objectively. 75 The injury in Bush, on the other hand, constituted a
subjective claim. 76 Regarding future votes, the threat of CIA illegalities could not be "traced" sufficiently to any concrete "disenfranchisement." 77 Regarding past votes, the alleged illegalities did
not divest the plaintiff of his legislative authority. 78 Thus, because
the "legislative process" remained intact, Congress suffered no
harm. Absent such direct institutional harm, no derivative injury
79
flowed to the congressional plaintiff.

The District of Columbia Circuit added a post-script to its
69 Id. at 458-59 (" 'In some fashion, every provision of the Constitution was meant to
serve the interest of all. Such a generalized interest, however, is too abstract to constitute a
"case or controversy" for federal resolution.' ") (citation omitted).
70 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
71 Id. at 199. See, e.g., note 58 supra.
72 Id. at 206 (emphasis omitted).
73 Id. at 208-09.
74 Id. at 212 ("[T]he court in Kennedy. . .refer[red] to a specific vote on a specific piece
of legislation; it is not a reference to the general legislative process and all of its facets.")
(emphasis in original).
75 Id. ("This objective standard is to be found in reference to 'official influence'; the
nature of this influence is determined by the Constitution, .... and not by an individual
legislator's conception.").
76 Id. ("[T]he appellant. . . asserts subjective injury to his overall effectiveness which
flows from his lack of information concerning the CIA.").
77 Id.
78 Id. at 213.
79 See id. at 199 n.41, 213. See note 65 supra.
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opinion in Bush, concluding that the overarching separation of powers issues present throughout the case also required dismissal for
lack of standing. 80 Under its reading of the Supreme Court's opinions in United States v. Richardson8 l and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,8 2 the court of appeals determined that standing
was an appropriate analytical vehicle by which to address separation of powers problems. 83 Because the plaintiff in Bush sought to
vindicate his personal political values and obtain results which his
colleagues refused him, the court denied standing. According to
the court, to hold otherwise would allow judicial usurpation of the
84
legislative process.
In summary, the rule of congressional standing in 1977 required that some interference with Congress' constitutional authority be alleged. In the majority of cases, this authority involved
Congress' legislative power.8 5 Unless the "legislative will" were
thwarted by some executive action, no injury in fact flowed to congressmen exercising their derivative voting rights. Moreover, challenges to both executive and legislative wisdom were insufficient
for congressmen to acquire standing. Since the former challenge
presents an enforcement issue and the latter reflects congressional
80 Part of the plaintiffs claim in Bush was that Congress allocated public monies to the
CIA through a general appropriations bill. As a result, it did not require a specific CIA
accounting for monies spent. Congress merely required a general accounting under article
I. The court's discussion of separation of powers concerns in Bush is additional to and
separate from its prior standing analysis on "traditional" injury in fact grounds. In relevant
part, the court observed:
As a conclusion to our analysis of appellant's Congressional standing claims
. . . it is worthwhile to consider the implications of a grant of standing on the
[subjective] grounds which appellant has set forth. . . . To accept these grounds
for standing would in effect allow any Congressional suit to challenge Executive
action, and an individual legislator would have a roving commission to obtain judicial relief under most circumstances. This would lead inevitably to the intrusion of
the courts into the proper affairs of the coequal branches of government ...
• . . Although we do not rest our denial of standing on these separation of
powers grounds, their existence does point to the need for a very clear showing of
concrete, personal injury in this type of case so that federal courts will not be
thrust into the role of "continuing monitors of the wisdom and the soundness of
Executive action . ... "
Id. at 214-15 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); cf. United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (Some subjects are committed to the surveillance of the political process. "Any other conclusion would mean that the Founding Fathers intended to set up
something in the nature of an Athenian democracy. . . to oversee the conduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits in the federal courts.").
81 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
82 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
83 553 F.2d at 214-15.
84 See id. at 215. See also note 30 supra.
85 Congress also possesses nonlegislative powers such as impeachment authority, approval of certain executive appointees, and treaty ratification. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 1, cls. 6
& 7; art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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judgment, neither challenge evidences the "legislative disenfranchisement" necessary under Kennedy and Bush.
B.

The Goldwater Decision: (1979)

The District of Columbia Circuit's analysis of congressional
standing in Bush is consistent with the Burger Court's current view
under Valley Forge insofar as it accommodates both traditional
standing policies and separation of powers concerns. Under Bush,
injury in fact is carefully limited to cases of derivative harm86 and,
correspondingly, standing is absent where intrabranch controver87
sies exist.

Decisions throughout 1977 and 1978 continued to require that
congressional plaintiffs demonstrate some legislative disenfranchisement consistent with Kennedy. 88 In 1979, however, the District of Columbia Circuit faced a special problem in Goldwater v.
Carter.89 There, congressional plaintiffs challenged the President's
unilateral termination of a foreign treaty without seeking Senate approval. 90 The difficulty in Goldwater was that the plaintiffs had a live,
objective claim of injury to their constitutional powers only if they
had a constitutional right to review treaty terminations-an issue to
be determined on the merits. 91
Finding some "legislative disenfranchisement" in Goldwater became a prerequisite to deciding the merits. However, neither a majority, nor even one-third plus one of the Senate expressly asserted
that it would vote against the treaty's termination. 92 Thus, as Judge
Wright observed, there was no clear evidence that the executive
had thwarted the legislative will. Absent such impairment-"the
paradigm of injury emerging from Kennedy" 93 -no individual congressman could claim legal standing.
86 See note 65 supra.
87 See 553 F.2d at 214-15.
88 See, e.g., Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(relying on Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (1977) which followed the Kennedy rationale);
Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975).
89 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc).
90 In 1978, President Carter announced that as ofJan. 1, 1979, the United States would
recognize the People's Republic of China (Mainland China) as the sole Chinese government. This recognition simultaneously would terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with
the Republic of China (Taiwan) a year later. This unilateral action, although made within
the Treaty's provisions, was taken without Senate approval. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617
F.2d 697, 700-01 (1979).
91 Id. at 702-03.
92 See McGowan, supra note 8, at 246 & n.21, 265. By a vote of 59-35 the Senate
amended language in a resolution to require the President to submit "any mutual defense
treaty between the United States and another nation" to the Senate for approval. 125
CONG. REC. 13,672, 13,697 (1979). However, no final vote ever was taken on the resolution
itself. See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 954 (D.D.C. 1979).
93 Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 711 (Wright. J, concurring).
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The court's solution to the standing problem focused on the
unavailability of political recourse for the plaintiffs. Independent
Senate action was futile unless the President first had a constitu94
tional obligation to obtain Senate approval of treaty terminations.
Thus, since no political recourse existed prior to a federal court's
decision regarding this constitutional obligation, the plaintiffs were
forced to seek judicial resolution of their complaint. 9 5 In the
court's view, the President's unilateral act deprived the plaintiffs of
the opportunity to cast a binding vote. This deprivation constituted a
"disenfranchisement" sufficient for derivative standing9 6 and allowed the court to reach the merits.
In a memorandum order, however, the Supreme Court vacated
the Goldwater decision without mentioning congressional standing. 97 Instead, the Court relied on the justiciability doctrines of
ripeness and the political question to avoid hearing the case. Writing independently, Justice Powell argued that the controversy in
Goldwater was not ripe for judicial disposition. In his opinion, the
judiciary had a prudential obligation to avoid issues affecting the
allocation of political power between the executive and legislative
branches. Only after the political branches reached a "constitutional impasse" should the judiciary intervene. 98 According to Justice Powell, since the Congress had not confronted the President
over the treaty termination, no controversy had "ripened" suffi94 See id. at 702, 703.
95 This case differs from the situaion where a congressman challenges the actions of his
legislative colleagues. Judicial intervention there intrudes into the domain of intrabranch
political administration. But the redress in Goldwater, like that in Kennedy, seeks to protect
the Congress from unconstitutional encroachment by the executive branch. Thus, the unavailability of legislative redress in Goldwater demonstrates that no threat exists of judicial
intervention into the work of the political branches.
96 See 617 F.2d at 702, 703.
97 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
98 Paramount in Justice Powell's opinion was the importance of judicial restraint in
political matters:
Prudential considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and the
President is not ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken
action asserting its constitutional authority. Differences between the President
and the Congress are commonplace under our system. The differences should,
and almost invariably do, turn on political rather than legal considerations. The
Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between
the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse.
Otherwise, we would encourage small groups or even individual Members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of issues before the normal political process has
the opportunity to resolve the conflict.
Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Justice Powell's view appears consonant with that of Alexander Bickel. Cf. United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 & n.8 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing with
approval, A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 122 (1962)). Merely because the judiciary has the power to decide such questions, its constitutional obligation to decide rests
upon the context of each case.
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ciently to warrant judicial intervention. 99
Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, writing for Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart and Stevens, determined that Goldwater
presented a nonjusticiable political question. First, there was no
textual guidance within the Constitution for resolving the treaty
question. Second, the issue involved foreign matters beyond the
competence of the courts.1 0 0 Thus, according to Justice Rehnquist,
the issue itself, rather than the form of its coming to the Court, was
beyond the scope of judicial review. 10 1
III.

Standing Analysis Applied to Congressmen Since 1980

The Supreme Court's failure in Goldwater to dispose of the case
in terms of standing raised significant questions about the standing
10 2
doctrine's viability as a mechanism for judicial self-restraint.
Moreover, because the Court addressed Goldwater's political overtones through traditional justiciability doctrines, courts and commentators inferred that there was no relationship between standing
and the separation of powers.' 0 3 This interpretation undermined
°4
the District of Columbia Circuit's analysis in Harrington v. BushI
99 If courts lack the information necessary to make a decision, they must wait until such
information becomes available. This waiting frequently will be until a political decision is
made by a coordinate branch of government. The philosophy surrounding such abstention
rests on the idea that "courts should not sap the quality of the political process by exercising initial as opposed to reviewing judgment." Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 TermForeward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40, 74 (1961).
100 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002-04 (Rehnquist,J., concurring). Justice Powell expressed
much concern overJustice Rehnquist's analysis in Goldwater. Justice Powell determined that
the goals of the political question doctrine under Baker v. Carr were threefold: to abstain
where the controversy was "textually committed" to a coordinate branch; to abstain where
a decision would be beyond judicial competence; and to abstain on prudential grounds. 1d.
at 998 (Powell, J., concurring).
In Goldwater, however, the absence of textual guidance differed substantially from the
presence of a textual commitment. Although the treaty termination question was difficult to
resolve, it was not a priori nonjusticiable. Judicially discoverable and manageable standards
were present within the normal bounds of constitutional interpretation; the fact that the
issue touched upon matters of foreign relations was inconsequential. Finally, since Carr's
third ground rested upon the fear that "multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question" would erode interbranch respect, Justice Powell found abstention
appropriate on ripeness grounds. The political departments would then be free to resolve
their disputes without judicial interference, but the Court would not forego its powers of
review if a "constitutional impasse" arose. Id. at 998-1000 (Powell, J., concurring). Only
then would the "spectre of the Federal Government [be] brought to a halt because of the
mutual intransigence of the President and the Congress[,] . . . requir[ing] th[e] Court to
provide a resolution .... " Id. at 1001 (Powell, J., concurring).
101 Cf. id. at 999-1000 (Powell, J., concurring) (under the political question doctrine, the
issue itself becomes nonjusticiable despite textually explicit guidance for courts to resolve
the dispute).
102 See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 8, at 256. See also Riegle v. Federal Open Market
Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
103 See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 8, at 256. See also 656 F.2d at 880.
104 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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and prompted a reassessment of the congressional standing
doctrine.
A.

The Equitable Discretion Doctrine

Because of the confusion surrounding Goldwater, the District of
Columbia Circuit adopted a new theory ofjudicial restraint the following year. The theory, entitled "equitable discretion," was developed earlier by former Chief Judge Carl McGowan. 0 5 In Judge
McGowan's view, a principled judicial analysis must be consistent
regardless of a plaintiff's political character. 0 6 Thus, constitutional
standing under article III should be the same for both private and
07
congressional plaintiffs.1
Judge McGowan argued, however, that in trying to address
separation of powers concerns, the circuit's standing doctrine failed
to achieve this neutrality. 0 8 He read both Bush and Goldwater as
requiring congressional plaintiffs to pursue collegial remedies
before seeking judicial review. 10 9 This reading established a basic
contradiction: that private and congressional plaintiffs were indistinguishable for standing purposes, but that congressional plaintiffs
acquired standing only when they suffered injury which their colleagues could not redress.
Judge McGowan's thesis was that if any plaintiff passed the
traditional standing "tests" and presented a justiciable dispute,
then the political branches presumably had committed the dispute
to the judiciary.110 ForJudge McGowan, the crucial problem lay in
the separation of powers considerations attending cases involving
congressional plaintiffs.'
In determining whether a dispute was justiciable, Judge McGowan initially turned to the traditional formulations-in particular, the political question doctrine. His analysis, however,
suggested that the political question doctrine was not really a test
for justiciability. Unlike ripeness, mootness, and standing, which
focus on the manner in which a viable question comes to a court,
application of the political question doctrine results in finding the
actual issue nonjusticiable. Thus, because characterizing a question
105 McGowan, supra note 8, at 241.
106 Id. at 254-55.
107 Id. at 254.
108 Id. at 254-55.
109 Id. at 254. Judge McGowan's reading of Bush and Goldwater suggested that before
acquiring standing "the [congressional] plaintiff suffer an injury that his colleagues cannot
redress." Id. This view, however, is totally unsupported either in the text or the footnotes
of his article. See notes 126-129 infra and accompanying text.
110 Id. at 255. See also K. RIPPLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 114 (1984) (the traditional
formula adopted in Riegle may be described as "injury in fact + causation").
111 See McGowan, supra note 8, at 242, 255, 259.
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as "political" forecloses judicial review, the political question doctrine is always a determination of the merits.' 12
Judge McGowan, however, argued that many cases involving
congressional plaintiffs presented justiciable issues. 1 3 To deal with
the attendant separation of powers problems, without creating new
difficulties through the rigidity of the political question analysis,
Judge McGowan suggested that courts accept jurisdiction over
cases involving congressional plaintiffs but dismiss them for pru14
dential reasons.
This approach gained currency when it was adopted in its entirety by the District of Columbia Circuit in Riegle v. Federal Open
Market Committee.115 In Riegle, the court of appeals read the
Supreme Court's Goldwater decision as a tacit rejection of technical
"congressional standing" for a more flexible approach to justiciability.116 In its view, however, the ripeness and political ques-

tion doctrines employed by the Court failed to ensure the flexibility
necessary to resolve the prudential issues arising in congressional
plaintiff cases.' 17 To ensure the proper exercise ofjudicial authority "inherent in the constitutional scheme for dividing federal
power,"' 18 the court of appeals invoked its equitable authority to
112 See id. at 257; cf Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 999-1000 (Powell, J., concurring).
113 McGowan, supra note 8, at 258-59. In Judge McGowan's opinion, the question of
treaty termination could have been addressed judicially. He felt, however, that because the
subject matter in Goldwater involved political processes, the Court abstained from hearing
the case. Judge McGowan interpreted this action as part of a broader legal theory of equitable discretion. Id. at 263. He analogized the political question doctrine to federal abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which rested on the "absence of the
factors necessary under equitable principles to justify federal intervention." 401 U.S. at 54.
Thus, rather than declare a dispute nonjusticiable, Judge McGowan suggested that courts
accept jurisdiction over cases involving separation of powers conflicts but dismiss them for
want of equity. McGowan, supra note 8, at 263.
114 McGowan, supra note 8, at 263. Judge McGowan's analysis partly followed that of
Professor Henkin. See Henkin, supra note 44, at 618-25 & nn.61-62. Professor Henkin has
concluded that the "political question" doctrine "is an unnecessary, deceptive packaging of
several established doctrines." While the doctrine has a proper role in American jurisprudence, Professor Henkin suggests that it really consists of the following propositions:
1) The courts are bound to accept decisions by the political branches within
their constitutional authority.
2) The courts will not find limitations or prohibitions on the powers of the
political branches where the Constitution does not prescribe any.
3) Not all constitutional limitations or prohibitions imply rights and standing
to object in favor of private parties.
4) The courts may refuse some (or all) remedies for want of equity.
5) In principle, finally, there may be constitutional provisions which can properly be interpreted as wholly or in part "self-monitoring" and not the subject of
judicial review.
Id. at 622-23.
115 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
116 See id. at 880.
117 Seeid.at881.
118 Id.
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deny relief.
In Riegle, the plaintiff alleged that the Federal Open Market
Committee ("FOMC") statutorily contained officers of the United
States who were not confirmed by the Senate. 119 Senator Riegle
claimed that this legislative scheme deprived him of his right to approve FOMC members. Applying what it termed "traditional"
standing analysis, 120 the District of Columbia Circuit determined
that the plaintiff had standing because he had alleged a personal
stake "in the outcome of the controversy [sufficient] . . . to justify
the exercise of the court's remedial powers." 1 2 ' Senator Riegle's
quarrel, however, was with his colleagues because of their refusal to
amend the objectional law. Therefore, the court dismissed the case
22
as one beyond the scope of proper judicial review.'
By adopting Judge McGowan's reading of Bush and Goldwater,
the Riegle court developed the following rules. Under prudential
principles, congressional plaintiffs have no judicial remedy either
where their challenges could be redressed by their colleagues or
where private plaintiffs likely would bring similar actions, regardless of standing andjusticiability.12 3 Where such legislative redress
is unavailable, or private action is unlikely, however, federal courts
will hear congressional suits if "traditional" standing rules are
satisfied.' 24
B.

Criticisms of the Equitable Discretion Doctrine

The equitable discretion doctrine fails either to accommodate
prior cases involving congressional plaintiffs or the Supreme
119 The Federal Reserve System is the nation's central bank. The FOMC is the part of
the System designed to formulate national monetary policy. The FOMC consists of seven
federal officers appointed by the President with the Senate's approval, and five members
elected by the boards of directors of the member banks. These five members are not approved by the Senate. An issue in Riegle was whether these five private members, because
of their function on the FOMC, held official offices of the United States in violation of the
article I appointments clause. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 874-76.
120 Id. at 878 (The court applied what it termed "the traditional standing tests for noncongressional plaintiffs" to evaluate the claims of injury to congressmen.). See also K. RipPLE, supra note 110, at 114.
121 Id. at 878-79 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)). The court also
found that Sen. Riegle had asserted a protectable interest under the appointments clause,
traced his injury to the defendant's action, and requested relief sufficient to remove the
harm of which he complained. Id. at 878-79. This analysis seemingly comports with the
Supreme Court's minimal standing "tests" in Valley Forge. See text accompanying notes 4243 supra. The Riegle court, however, found injury to a legislator's official "interests," despite the absence of "derivative injury" under Kennedy and Bush. This finding suggests that
Riegle erroneously rejects the derivative injury theory and thus expands standing, despite
the Burger Court's general trend towards judicial restraint. See notes 126-129 infra and
accompanying text.
122 See id. at 882.
123 Id.
124 Id.
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Court's Goldwater decision. Nor is the doctrine compatible with the
Burger Court's general philosophy of judicial restraint. First, the
doctrine is premised on Judge McGowan's misreading of Bush and
Goldwater. Second, the doctrine greatly expands the concept of personal "injury in fact" to congressional plaintiffs. And third, Riegle's
application of equitable discretion fails to account for the results in
the Supreme Court's Goldwater decision. This criticism is further
supported by demonstrating that the Court's Goldwater decision is
completely consistent with the Kennedy-Bush theory of derivative
injury.
1. The equitable discretion doctrine is erroneously premised.
Judge McGowan read the court of appeals' decisions in Bush
and Goldwater as requiring congressmen to show both injury in fact
and the unavailability of legislative redress before they could acquire individual standing. 125 This reading, however, is mistaken
and misapprehends the underpinnings of derivative standing. In
neither case did the court establish a two step congressional standing inquiry as Judge McGowan suggests.' 26 Rather, the absence of
legislative redress was either a corroborative element in finding actual derivative injury (Bush) or merely evidence to show that judicial
27
relief would not infringe the political system (Goldwater).'
125 See text accompanying notes 63-65, 77-78 supra. Nowhere in the text of his article,
however, does Judge McGowan cite to case language clearly supporting his argument.
126 Judge Skelly Wright's review of congressional standing in the District of Columbia
Circuit as of 1977 shows clearly that derivative injury alone was sufficient to give congressmen standing.
The question of standing where a legislator claims injury to his lawmaking
role is not new to this court. . . . [W]e have developed a strict approach to evaluating the unique type of injury that arises when a legislator challenges Executive
action ....
. . . Under the paradigm of injury emerging from Kennedy, ..
[tihe injury
derives from the injury to the legislature, and becomes personal to the indivdual
congressman-plaintiff....
The Supreme Court's pronouncements on standing compel this view. As we
have noted, where a legislator alleges Executive impairment of the effectiveness of
his vote his injury can only be derivative. He cannot suffer injury in fact unless
Congress suffers injury in fact. Congress suffers no injury unless the Executive has
thwarted its will ....
Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 710-12 (Wright, J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted); cf.
Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 779 (1985) ("From Kennedy v. Sampson to Harringlonv. Bush. .. we have held that
unconstitutional deprivations of a legislator's constitutional duties or rights, such as the
nullification of a legislator's vote. . . ,may give rise to standing .... ").
127 The derivative injury theory logically compels the conclusion in Bush that congressional plaintiffs do not have standing where they could seek legislative redress. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 712 & n.7 (WrightJ., concurring). According to the theory, the availability
of legislative redress suggests that no institutional, and thus no derivative, injury exists. See,
e.g., Bush, 553 F.2d at 215. Absent some derivative injury, no congressional standing exists.
The absence of legislative redress, therefore, merely corroborates the existence of deriva-
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The equitable discretion doctrine expands injury in fact.

Neither Bush nor Goldwater departed from the accepted injury
in fact test, as narrowly drawn by the Burger Court. They merely
held that congressmen, by virtue of the legislative office, could suffer only derivative injury in fact.1 28 This analysis is consistent with
the Supreme Court's restriction of injury in fact. Riegle, however,
departed from the derivative injury approach under the euphemism
of "traditional" standing. 29 By finding injury to a congressman's
right to approve FOMC members, and ignoring congressional intent to limit that right, Riegle expanded the scope of injury in fact
for congressmen. Riegle, therefore, is inconsistent with the Burger
Court's contraction of standing.
3.

The equitable discretion doctrine fails to account for the
Goldwater results.

The Riegle court, through the equitable discretion doctrine, attempted to account for the Supreme Court's Goldwater decision.
The Riegle court suggested that the senators in Goldwater had available to them appropriate legislative relief 3 0 and thus prudentially
should have been denied judicial review. Although Riegle's result
comports with that of the Supreme Court's Goldwater decision, its
argument mischaracterizes the legislative redress available in Goldwater. The Senate in Goldwater had little power to change the President's termination decision; in fact, all it could do was pass a nonbinding resolution expressing its official opinion. 13 1 Since this action would not redress the plaintiff senators' alleged injury, the equitable discretion doctrine actually suggests that the senators
should have been heard. 3 2 This result is contrary to the Supreme
tive injury. It neither departs from the traditional standing inquiry nor prescribes a second
test for congressional standing.
The question of legislative redress in Goldwater, on the other hand, was totally unrelated to the issue of derivative injury. There, the absence of such redress was not a prerequisite to standing. Rather, it merely evidenced the fact that since political relief was
unavailable, judicial review would not intrude on the political process. See 617 F.2d at 703.
Thereafter, the court found standing solely on the grounds of some legislative disenfranchisement consistent with the derivative injury theory. See note 95 supra.
128 See note 126 supra.
129 See note 121 supra.
130 Riegle, 656 F.2d at 880 ("[C]ollegial remedies existed because Senate resolutions
• . . were pending at the time.").
131 Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 703 ("The crucial fact is that. . . there is no conceivable senatorial action that could likely prevent termination. . . . A congressional resolution or statute
• . . could not block termination. . . . [T]he only way the Senate can effectively vote on a
treaty termination, with the burden on termination proponents to secure a two-thirds majority, is for the President to submit the proposed treaty termination to the Senate .
(emphasis added). See also notes 91-96 supra and accompanying text.
132 The Goldwater plaintiffs had no real opportunity for legislative redress. See note 131
supra and accompanying text. Moreover, since the injury in Goldwater was to a legislative
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Court's disposition in the case and the equitable discretion doctrine
fails by negative implication.
4.

The Supreme Court's Goldwater decision is consistent with the
derivative injury theory.

The Supreme Court's opinion in Goldwater, however, may be
interpreted consistently with Kennedy and Bush. Fifty-nine senators
voted for resolution language requiring the President to seek twothirds approval of any treaty terminations. 33 But the resolution
never reached the Senate floor for a final vote. Had the resolution
been enacted, the block of senators whose ratification "opportunity" would be affected by the President's action would have suffered derivative injury. 34 Thus, if the Supreme Court in Goldwater
assumed that these senators either had or subsequently could have
obtained standing by suffering a derivative injury to their combined
legislative will, then analyzing the case through justiciability doctrines other than standing was essential to avoid hearing the
merits.1'5
Under these circumstances, Justice Powell's opinion is explained easily. He felt the Court should not assume jurisdiction until such a vote forced a ripe "constitutional impasse."'' 36 On the
other hand, if the Court never wanted to address the merits, then
voting "opportunity," see text accompanying notes 94-96 supra, it is unlikely that private
actions could arise. Finally, applying Riegle's expanded scope of injury in fact for congressmen, the Goldwater plaintiffs appear to have "traditional" standing. Given these factors,
Riegle's equitable discretion doctrine actually suggests that the Goldwater plaintiffs should
have been heard. See text accompanying notes 123-24 supra. Thus, Riegle's approach clearly
fails to explain the Supreme Court's decision in Goldwater.
133 125 CONG. REc. 13,672, 13,697 (1979). See also note 92 supra.
134 The concept of a lost voting "opportunity" may be explained through a more general theory of derivative injury. The right of congressmen to vote may be seen as deriving
from some constitutional "voting block" within Congress. Normally, this "block" would be
a one or two house majority. But in Goldwater, the appropriate "block" was composed of 34
senators.
In Goldwater, the right in question was whether two-thirds of the Senate had to approve
treaty terminations. For the Goldwater plaintiffs, this right translated to whether one-third
plus one of the Senate could bar the President's unilateral action. Thus, the constitutional
voting "block" was a minority of senators. And the impossibility of this minority to obtain
collegial action (even if available, see note 131 supra), constituted the requisite "disenfranchisement." See notes 94-96 supra and accompanying text.
135 As the court of appeals observed in Goldwater, the plaintiff senators claimed "the
right to block termination with only one-third plus one of their colleagues." 617 F.2d at
703. Thus, since the court found that this minority had standing to protect its "opportunity" to vote, one logically may infer that the court's protections extend to some constitutional "voting block" within Congress. See id. See also text accompanying notes 94-96 supra.
136 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring). At this point, the "block" of 34
senators would certainly have voted for the resolution. Once they demonstrated their voting preferences, the refusal by the President to submit the Mutual Defense Treaty to the
Senate for review disenfranchised this "block" of its voting "opportunity." See Goldwater,
617 F.2d at 713.
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Justice Rehnquist's approach applies. 13 7 His application of the
political question doctrine ensures that the merits themselves,
rather than the case as presented, were nonjusticiable. 138 In either
event, the Court did not upset the prevailing theory of congressional standing based upon derivative injury.
This alternative reading of Goldwater currently is supported by
the Supreme Court's opinion in Valley Forge ChristianCollege v. Americans Unitedfor a Separation of Church and State, Inc.' 3 9 The Court has
subsumed into the constitutional definition of standing the separation of powers concerns formerly thought reserved to the political
question doctrine.' 40 And to the extent that congressmen have
standing, Valley Forge suggests a very restrictive rule. Thus, the only
rule consistent with the Burger Court's jurisprudence appears to be
that of derivative injury employed in the Kennedy, Bush, and Goldwater decisions. Under this doctrine "once it is determined that
[there] is a suit by congressmen, against congressmen, pertaining
to their legislative powers, that. . . end[s] . . . the matter."' 4 '
C.

Current Status and Future Impact of the Equitable Discretion Doctrine

In light of Valley Forge, the Supreme Court's approach to standing has assumed a markedly "interpretivist" character. 42 Deference to the political branches has assumed more than a prudential
status. Valley Forge now requires courts constitutionally to address
43
separation of powers considerations in their standing analyses.'
Despite the clear implications that Riegle is incompatible with the
Burger Court's philosophy in Valley Forge, however, the current rule
44
in the District of Columbia Circuit still is "equitable discretion."'
The court of appeals continues to grant standing to congress137 See Bickel, supra note 99, at 76. Since the issue in Goldwater involved the right of a
congressional minority to bar the President's unilateral treaty termination, the underlying
question was whether 34 senators could block the political judgment of 66 senators. Had
the Court addressed Goldwater's merits, it would have decided intrabranch rights. Although
this note agrees withJustice Powell's rationale in Goldwater, it recognizes the intrabranch (as
well as interbranch) problems which the case raised.
138 See note 113 supra. See also Henkin, supra note 8, at 599.
139 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
140 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) ("The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers."). See also notes 45-50 supra and
accompanying text.
141 *Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 779 (1985).
142 See text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
143 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for a Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-74 (1982). See note 46 supra.
144 See, e.g., Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 779 (1985); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Vander
Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 91 (1983); Riegle v. Federal
Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
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men with intrabranch quarrels, but denies them redress on prudential grounds. 145 The reason for this approach, aside from
misapprehending derivative injury, appears to be the court's fear
that to deny standing will make redress of Congress' article I viola146
tions impossible.
Such sympathy, however, is not a license for federal courts to
assume jurisdiction. Since 1974, the Burger Court has stated
clearly that the absence of a party with standing to sue "isno reason
to find standing."' 147 Rather, as ChiefJustice Burger cautions, "the
absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims
gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed
to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political
48
process."1
145 In VanderJagt, the court found standing for 14 Republican House members to sue
the Speaker of the House. Plaintiffs alleged that a disproportionate allocation of political
representation on key House committees had diluted their political power. Although the
court found the case justiciable, it refused to address the merits under the doctrine of equitable discretion. Similarly, in Moore, the court found standing for 18 House members to sue
the House itself. Plaintiffs claimed that certain Senate action nullified their right to originate, by debate and vote, all revenue bills. Again, through its equitable discretion, the
court of appeals found standing but denied review of the merits on prudential grounds.
The claims in VanderJagtand Moore centered on intrabranch disputes. Judges Bork and
Scalia, in each case respectively, argued strongly against finding jurisdiction over the internal affairs of the political branches. Because of the strong separation of powers problems
attending such matters, both judges held that Valley Forge counseled against granting standing in these cases. Nevertheless, the District of Columbia Circuit found standing based
upon its precedent in Riegle.
146 See, e.g., Moore, 733 F.2d at 953 ("Because any claim under the Origination Clause,
including one brought by a private taxpayer, will necessarily pertain to the exercise of legislative power, under [a contrary]. . . analysis, no one will ever have standing to sue for such
an alleged constitutional violation.") (emphasis in original).
147 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 489 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. 208,
227 (1974)).
148 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). Professor Doernberg argues,
however, that the theoretical foundations of American government require courts to protect "collective rights." See Doernberg, "We the People'" John Locke, Collective Constitutional
Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REv. 52, 95-117 (1985). His
premise is that the Lockean concept of consensual civil government requires the political
branches to account generally to the public at large. Id. at 57-64. But if the government's
"accountability must be to the group, not to any individual member of it," id. at 64, then
ChiefJustice Burger's view in Richardson comports with Locke's theory.
According to Locke, constitutions are the "social compacts" between the governed and
the government. See id. at 62-63; id. at 64-65 (quoting E. DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY 31-32 (1950)). Further, Locke suggests that the
collective social right permits total dissolution of government where the people's trust is
breached. Doernberg, supra, at 64 & n.69. Such total dissolution, however, would dissolve
the judicial branch, as well as the political branches. Thus, the judiciary clearly is not an
extra-governmental entity designed to protect the "collective" interest.
To avoid this analytical result, Professor Doernberg suggests that "[t]he American
political system has . . . modified Locke's model by developing two methods of governmental accountability other than revolution: the elective process and judicial review." Id.
at 67. But Professor Doernberg's analysis improperly characterizes the separation of powers dynamic and segregates the blended powers concept inherent in the Constitution.
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The differences between the approaches in Valley Forge and
Riegle are subtle, but important. Under the Burger Court's philosophy of judicial restraint, Valley Forge finds certain cases nonjusticiable by denying standing. This approach precludes courts from ever
assuming power to hear cases best left to the political process.1 4 9
The Riegle approach, however, permits courts to acquire jurisdiction but abstain voluntarily from reviewing the merits. Under
Riegle, the scope ofjudicial power is expanded, and the sole barrier
to review rests on judicial discretion. As Judge Bork noted recently, the modem standing doctrine "raises ajurisdictional bar to
judicial power, while remedial discretion . . . raises no bar and
grants the judiciary unfettered discretion to hear a case or not, depending on the attractiveness of the idea."1 50
The doctrine of equitable discretion thus expands the scope of
judicial review contrary to the trends indicated by the Burger
Court. And despite the court of appeals' exculpating statements,
the doctrine "suggests the sort of rudderless adjudication that
courts strive to avoid."1 5 1 Instead of providing a principled rule of
adjudication, equitable discretion empowers federal courts to decide (or not decide as individual jurists see fit) cases involving intrabranch quarrels. 152 Ironically, this power fosters the "freeMoreover, it threatens to raise the antimajoritarian power ofjudicial review above the democratic process of elective redress. See A. BICKEL, supra note 98, at 16-17.
When the public, the collective body, has a stake in the outcome of a controversy, the
appropriate recourse, within the political system is through the elective process. As Justice
Rehnquist has observed:
Representative government is predicated upon the idea that one who feels deeply
upon a question as a matter of conscience will seek out others of like view or will
attempt to persuade others who do not initially share that view. When adherents
to the belief become sufficiently numerous, he will have the necessary armaments
required in a democratic society to press his views upon the elected representatives of the people, and to have them embodied into positive law.
• . .It is always time consuming, frequently difficult, and not infrequently impossible to run successfully the legislative gauntlet and have enacted some facet of
one's own deeply felt valuejudgments. It is even more difficult for either a single
individual or indeed for a large group of individuals to succeed in having such a
value judgment embodied in the Constitution. All of these burdens and difficulties are entirely consistent with the notion of a democratic society. It should not
be easy for any one individual or group of individuals to impose by law their value
judgments upon fellow citizens who may disagree with those judgments. Indeed,
it should not be easier just because the individual in question is a judge. We all
have a propensity to want to do it, but there are very good reasons for making it
difficult to do.
Rehnquist, Observation: The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. Rav. 693, 705-06

(1976).
149

See note 47 supra.

150 VanderJagt, 699 F.2d at 1184 (Bork, J., concurring) ("equitable" and "remedial" discretion in this context are interchangeable terms).
151 Id. at 1175.
152 Professor Bickel criticized this enlargement of judicial discretion over twenty years
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wheeling interventionism"

which Judge McGowan hoped to

remedy.153

D.

The Viability of the Derivative Injury Theory
Although the derivative injury concept is consistent with the
Burger Court's general contraction of injury in fact, its viability
seems to hinge on that of Kennedy v. Sampson.' 54 In Judge Bork's
opinion, thejudiciary's authority to entertain cases brought by congressional plaintiffs is limited to Kennedy's derivative injury theory. 155 According to Judge Scalia, however, Kennedy arose during
the transition from the active Warren Court to the more restrained
Burger Court. 156 Thus, in light of Valley Forge's integration of separation of powers concepts into article III standing, Judge Scalia ar157
gues that "Kennedy is no longer good law."'
Judge Scalia stresses that congressional plaintiffs wield the
power of their office not as private citizens, but as public servants.' 58 Any protectable interest, therefore, belongs to the public,
not individual congressmen.' 59 Thus, until the political process
forces a result which harms private individuals, courts constitutionago. A. BICKEL, supra note 98, at 122. Commenting on a colleague's liberal views regarding
judicial review, Professor Bickel argued that narrow standing rules restrict the expanded
discretion like that present in Riegle. See id. (addressing Jaffe, Standing to SecureJudicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1265 (1960); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review:
PrivateActions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255 (1961)). According to Professor Bickel, "[i]f a case is
offered by a conventional plaintiff who has standing in the pure sense . . . the question
whether or not the Court must hear it is answered by the federal law of remedies ....
There is no judicial discretion to decline adjudication, no such attenuation of the duty." A.
BICKEL, supra note 98, at 122.
153 McGowan, supra note 8, at 252.
The duty to decide justiciable cases, according to Professor [Herbert] Wechsler, is embedded in the doctrine of judicial review itself, as enunciated by Chief
Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. . . . In an analogous vein, Professor Gerald Gunther laments those who would transform a narrow ability to decline adjudicating certain cases into a "virtually unlimited choice in deciding whether to
decide." Reliance on unprincipled grounds to avoid adjudication, Professor Gunther warns, can "frequently inflict damage upon legitimate areas of principle." He
notes a final irony: unprincipled refusals to adjudicate justiciable cases where
"there is an obligation to decide" are really "a virulent variety of free-wheeling
interventionism"
Id. (footnotes omitted).
154 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The derivative injury theory first arose in Kennedy and
later was refined in Bush. See notes 70-73 supra and accompanying text. The actual presence of congressional standing based on this theory, however, existed only in Kennedy.
155 See VanderJagt, 699 F.2d at 1182 (Bork, J., concurring).
156 See Moore, 733 F.2d at 961 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157 Id. (footnote omitted).
158 Id. at 959. Congressmen have a private right to the office itself, Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), and the emoluments of the office. Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486 (1969).
159 733 F.2d at 959 & n.1 (Judge Scalia's view is a "conceptualism" which "reflects and
facilitates application of. . . the doctrine of separation of powers.").
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ally have no jurisdiction over such institutional quarrels.1 60 Stated
differently, Judge Scalia suggests that constitutional protections
were "conferred for the benefit not of the governors but of the governed."' 61 And since private plaintiffs cannot enforce congressional authority, no standing exists for anyone either to bring intra1 62
or inter-branch claims.
IV. Conclusion
The current rule in the District of Columbia Circuit, using equitable discretion to decide cases involving congressional plaintiffs,
is premised on an erroneous reading of the Bush and Goldwater decisions regarding derivative injury. Moreover, equitable discretion is
philosphically incompatible with the Valley Forge doctrine. This result does not mean, however, that the derivative injury theory is a
suitable replacement for equitable discretion. While the derivative
injury theory allows congressmen restricted access to federal courts
under traditional theories of injury in fact, it does not avoid the separation of powers problems present in such cases. Thus, under the
Burger Court's unified approach to standing, the derivative injury
doctrine also may be inadequate to address cases involving congressional plaintiffs. If so, then Kennedy is no longer good law. And
1 63
without Kennedy, congressional standing is reduced to a nullity.
Arthur H. Abel
160 Id. at 959. Judge Scalia concludes:
The only test of congressional standing that is both consistent with our constitutional traditions and susceptible of principled application (i.e., an application undistorted by the ad-hoc ery of "remedial discretion") must take as its point of
departure the principle that we sit here neither to supervise the internal workings
of the executive and legislative branches nor to umpire disputes between those
branches regarding their respective powers. Unless and until those internal workings, or the resolution of those inter-branch disputes through the system of checks
and balances. . . brings forth a result that harms private rights, it is no part of our
constitutional province, which is "solely, to decide on the rights of individuals."
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); cf. Nichol, Standing on the Constitution: The
Supreme Court and Valley Forge, 61 N.C.L. REv. 798, 819-27 (1983) (both Justices Powell and
Rehnquist support a "private rights" theory of legal standing). As an example of where
executive or legislative action harms private plaintiffs,Judge Scalia cites INS v. Chadha, 103
S. Ct. 2764 (1983). But the peculiar facts of that case, and the suggestion that Chadha
constituted an appropriate use ofjudicial power, forces one to question the quality ofJudge
Scalia's illustration. See, e.g., Note, INS v. Chadha: The Future Demise of Legislative Delegation
and the Need for a ConstitutionalAmendment, 11 J. LEGIS. 317, 333-36 (1984).
161 Moore, 733 F.2d at 960 (Scalia, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
162 Cf. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) ("[Ihe absence of any
particular individual. . . to litigate [certain constitutional] claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the. . . political process."). See text accompanying note 148 supra.
163 The Supreme Court's recent denial of certiorari in Moore, 105 S. Ct. 779 (1985), may
suggest a different conclusion, however. The question presented for review was whether a
federal court may "refuse to decide a justiciable constitutional question patently within its
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jurisdiction solely on the grounds that, in its discretion, it chooses not to do so?" 53
U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1984). By denying certiorari, the Court may signal a tacit
approval of the equitable discretion doctrine.
Yet, commentators run the risk of inferring too much from a denial of certiorari. Had
the Court granted certiorari in Moore, it would have faced difficult questions about congressional standing and justiciability, as well as about the legitimacy of discretionary dismissals.
Declining review in Moore merely may exemplify the Court's prudential decision not to decide. See A. BICKEL, supra note 98, at 127-33, 200-07.

